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Data Package Standard

Security

Authors Johannes Jander, Data Package Working Group

Security considerations around Data Packages and Data Resources.

Language

The key words MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

Usage Perspective

Data packages is a container format that allows the creator to specify payload data (Resources) either as JSON objects/arrays or via pointers. There are two pointer formats:

  • local file system references. Those follow POSIX naming conventions and have to be relative to the Package Descriptor file (“datapackage.json”). Absolute paths are disallowed as they would open data exfiltration attacks. They would also be rarely useful, considering you typically cannot know the file system layout of the user’s computer
  • URLs as pointers to remote Resources. They are intended to load datasets from sites like statistic’s offices as the basis of Data Packages. Only HTTP/HTTPS URLs are allowed, library maintainers have to filter out others like file-URLs

Both formats can open security holes that can be used to attack the user’s computer and/or network. It is therefore STRONGLY recommended to limit the kind of Resource pointers you allow on your machines if you accept Data Packages from third party sources.

ONLY in a trusted environment (eg. your own computer during development of Data Packages) is it recommended to allow all kinds of Resource pointers. In every other environment, you MUST keep the various attack scenarios in mind and filter out potentially dangerous Resource pointer types

Dangerous Descriptor/Resource pointer combinations

How to read the table: if your “datapackage.json”-file comes from one of the sources on the left, you should treat Resources in the format on the top as:

  • red: disallowed
  • yellow: potentially dangerous
  • green: safe to use

Security Matrix

Descriptor source is a URL

If your descriptor is loaded via URL, and the server to which the URL points is not fully trusted, you SHOULD NOT allow Data Packages with Resource pointers in

  • URLs. As described in issue #650, URLs crafted by the author of a Data Package can be used in a “keyhole” attack to probe your network layout.
  • Absolute file system references. Absolute paths can be used to exfiltrate system files (eg. /etc/passwd on Unix-like systems). Relative paths will be converted to URLs relative to the descriptor URL, so they will not load data from the local file system and are therefore safe.

URL-based Resource pointers can furthermore be used for denial of service attacks on either the user’s system or a service hosting Resource data. A relatively small Data Package could still hold thousands of Resource URLs that each could point to very large CSV files hosted somewhere. The Data Package processing library would load all those CSV files which might overwhelm the user’s computer. If an attacker were able to spread such a malicious Data Package, this could exhaust the resources of a hosting service.

Descriptor source is a local relative path

If your descriptor is loaded via a local relative path, and the source of the Data Package is not fully trusted, you SHOULD NOT allow Data Packages with Resource pointers in

  • URLs. As described in issue #650, URLs crafted by the author of a Data Package can be used in a “keyhole” attack to probe your network layout.
  • Absolute file system references. Absolute paths can be used to exfiltrate system files (eg. /etc/passwd on Unix-like systems). Relative paths will be converted to paths relative to the Descriptor file system reference, so they are considered harmless.

As long as the producer of the Data Package is on the same local network as the computer/server parsing it, it is considered safe to reference Resources via URLs, as the creator could map the network from their own workstation just as well as crafting malicious Data Packages. In the above table, this case is therefore coded in yellow.

If Data Package parsing is part of a service offered to computers across subnets on the same LAN or even open to the internet, it NEVER safe to accept Data Packages containing URL-based Resource pointers.

Descriptor source is a local relative path

While it is never safe to accept absolute file paths for Resources, it is perfectly safe to accept them for Descriptor files. If your descriptor is loaded via a local absolute path, and the source of the Data Package is not fully trusted, you SHOULD NOT allow Data Packages with Resource pointers in

  • URLs. As described in issue #650, URLs crafted by the author of a Data Package can be used in a “keyhole” attack to probe your network layout.
  • Absolute file system references. Absolute paths can be used to exfiltrate system files (eg. /etc/passwd on Unix-like systems). Relative paths will be converted to paths relative to the Descriptor file system reference, so they are considered harmless.

As long as the producer of the Data Package is on the same local network as the computer/server parsing it, it is considered safe to reference Resources via URLs, as the creator could map the network from their own workstation just as well as crafting malicious Data Packages. In the above table, this case is therefore coded in yellow.

If Data Package parsing is part of a service offered to computers across subnets on the same LAN or even open to the internet, it NEVER safe to accept Data Packages containing URL-based Resource pointers.

Descriptor source is a JSON object

If the Descriptor is not loaded from file but created in-memory and the source of the Data Package is not fully trusted, you SHOULD NOT allow Data Packages with Resource pointers in

  • URLs. As described in issue #650, URLs crafted by the author of a Data Package can be used in a “keyhole” attack to probe your network layout.
  • file system references, relative or absolute. Absolute paths can be used to exfiltrate system files (eg. /etc/passwd on Unix-like systems). Relative paths would be constructed relative to the parsing software’s working directory and could be used to guess at configuration files to exfiltrate. OTOH, in creation of a Data Package, and if the relative paths are confined to a subdirectory, it is safe to use relative paths.

As long as the producer of the Data Package is on the same local network as the computer/server parsing it, it is considered safe to reference Resources via URLs, as the creator could map the network from their own workstation just as well as crafting malicious Data Packages. In the above table, this case is therefore coded in yellow.

If Data Package parsing is part of a service offered to computers across subnets on the same LAN or even open to the internet, it NEVER safe to accept Data Packages containing URL-based Resource pointers.

Descriptor source is a self-created JSON object

If the Descriptor is not loaded from file or created via a third-party application but by your software, it is generally assumed you know what you do and therefore, loading Resources from URLs or file is considered safe. You still SHOULD NOT use absolute paths as a matter of precaution - and implementing libraries should filter them out.

Implemention Perspective

Two kinds of Resource pointers can never be guaranteed to be totally safe:

  • Absolute file system references. Absolute paths can be used to exfiltrate system files (eg. /etc/passwd on Unix-like systems). In your implementation, you SHOULD either raise an error if an absolute local path is encountered or relativize it to the Descriptor path.
  • URLs. As described in issue #650, URLs crafted by the author of a Data Package can be used in a “keyhole” attack to probe your user’s network layout. It is up to the library creator to create means that allow their users to mitigate this attack.

As URLs are part of the DNA of Data Packages, it is not advisable to disallow their use completely. However, you should allow for a security setting that stops your implementation from loading URL-based Resources. This could be done

  • via a setting switch (insecure/default) that allows the user of your library implementation to allow or disallow absolute file paths and URL-based Resource pointers
  • via a pluggable security filter that is applied as an interceptor before loading any pointer-based Resources. If you decide to use such a scheme, you SHOULD provide default implementations for a filter disallowing URL-based Resource and an insecure filter that allows loading of all Resources.

Security Filters

If disallowing all URL-based Resources is too heavy-handed and allowing all is too insecure, finer-grained filters should be implemented. Those finer security filters can be implemented as either blacklist or whitelist filters. Blacklist filters in principle allow all URLs and restrict some, whereas whitelist filters deny all as a default and have a limited list of allowed URLs.

Blacklist filters in their most basic implementation would have to disallow all non-routed IP-addresses like the 192.168.x.x range or the 10.100.x.x range. This would blunt mapping attacks against the internal network of your users but needs to be well thought out as even one omission could endanger network security

Whitelist filters are much more secure as they allow the loading of Resources from a named list of domains only, but might be too restrictive for some uses.